Laudator Temporis Acti

P.A. Brunt, "Marcus Aurelius in His Meditations," Journal of Roman Studies 64 (1974) 1-20 (at 9):

Even among Greek moralists veracity is little discussed or commended.⁴⁶ I can find only one allusion to it in Epictetus (Ench. 52). Plutarch suggests that from time to time we should follow special moral exercises and for a given period refrain from sexual intercourse, wine and lying (464B)! Plato authorized his philosopher kings to deceive their subjects for their own good, and the idea was not alien to the old Stoics;⁴⁷ it does not occur to Marcus, who would speak plainly in the senate (n. 44). His attitude is more typical of the good old Roman than of Greeks; he wished to act 'as a Roman' (ii, 5). Nepos praises Atticus because 'mendacium neque dicebat neque pati poterat' (Att. 15, 1); this was characteristic of traditional Roman moral values.⁴⁸ They obtained in the circle of Marcus' early years; he recalls the truthfulness of Severus and Maximus (i, 14 f.), and from Fronto he had learned to avoid 'tyrannical hypocrisy' (i, ii). Both he and Verus told Fronto that he had taught them truthfulness,⁴⁹ and Fronto himself names love of veracity and straightforwardness as ideals.⁵⁰ Hellenistic and Imperial Roman thought on statecraft tends to be content with representing the model ruler as the virtuotus man, but it seems to be only in Roman treatments of his good qualities that truthfulness and simplicity strongly appear, perhaps first under Trajan, who is contrasted by Pliny and others with the tyrant Domitian, 'insidiossissimus princeps '.⁵¹ For Dio Marcus himself was a 'truly good man, free of all pretence' (lxxi, 34, 4).

⁴⁶ Pythagoras allegedly taught that men approximate to the gods by τὸ ἀληθεύειν (telling the truth) and conferring benefits (Ael., VH xii, 59). Other moralists of course reprehend lying (cf. n. 41; Plato, Laws 730C; 943E, cf. Alcib. 122A) as a general rule, but without Marcus' emphasis. Epictetus constantly uses πιστός of the good man, but men thought that philosophers condoned lying (iv, 6, 33).

⁴⁷ e.g. Rep. 389 B; 459 C. Cf. SVF iii, 513; 554; ii 132; but note iii, 629.

⁴⁸ 'Verus, veritas' constantly mean 'truthful, veracity' in Latin, see Forcellini's Lexicon, and are often linked with 'fides' (on which E. Fraenkel, Kl. Beiträge i, 15 ff.) and simplicitas, cf. nn. 49, 50, 55. Cf. Cic., de Offic. i, 63: 'itaque viros fortes et magnanimos, eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus'; 109: 'veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici '; perhaps the Roman (cf. e.g. Verr. ii, 1,4; 3,144; Quinct. 10; Balb. 12), rather than the translator of Panaetius, is speaking. Cf. also 'apertus et simplex' (Fam. i, 9, 22 etc.); Pliny, ep. ii, 9,4; iv, 22,3; ix, 25,2.

⁴⁹ i, 16 H. = 49 N.: 'verum me (Marcus) dicere satius simul et audire verum me doces'; ii, 18 = 130 N.: Verus has leamed from Fronto 'prius multo simplicitatem verique amorem quam loquendi polite disciplinam'.

⁵⁰ ii, 230 H. = 235 N.: 'multa ... fideliter ... consulta ... Verum dixi sedulo, verum audivi libenter.' ii, 224 H. = 232 N.: 'Victorinum pietate mansuetudine veritate innocentia maxima '. ii, 154 H. = 135 N.: 'simplicitas, castitas, veritas, fides Romana plane, φιλοστοργία vero nescio an Romana . . ., (For the last quality cf. Med. i, 11 with 9,3; 17,7; vi, 30,1; xi, 18,4; Epict. i, 11,6; 23,3; ii, 17,38.)

⁵¹ Pliny, Pan. 1,6; 49,8; 54,5; 67,1; 84,1; 95,3; the same contrast in Mart. x, 72 with Domitian, on whom cf. Tac., Agr. 42; Suet., Dom. ii; Dio lxvii, 1; see also on Tiberius, another 'tyrant', Tac., Ann. i, 11,2; vi, 50,1; 51,3 etc.; Suet., Tib. 24,11 42,1; Dio lvii, 1. The ideal of 'veri affectus': Tac., Hist. i, 15,4. On Trajan, Dio lxviii, 5,3; 6,2; Dio Chrys. (cf. n. 45) iii, 2. Veracity and simplicity do not appear in the evidence collected by W. Schubart, 'Das Hellenistische Königsideal nach Inschr. u. Papyri', Arch. f. Pap. xii, i ff., nor in what we have of Greek treatises on monarchy by 'Ecphantus' and 'Diotogenes', probably of Roman imperial date (L. Delatte, Les Traités de la royauté. . . 1942), yet reflecting Hellenistic thought; there is one reference in Aristeas' letter, s. 206. Dio Chrysostom depicts the ideal king as truthful, sincere and simple (i, 26; ii, 26), perhaps because Trajan was so regarded. Arrian's view that a king like Ptolemy I should tell the truth (Anab. pr.) might simply represent his own (Roman?) view, but in vii, 5,2, perhaps from Ptolemy himself, he ascribes this view to Alexander.